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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Incentives tripled from 1990 
to 2015, increasing from 9 
percent of state/local business 
taxes to 30 percent.
 
n Incentives often vary 
by a factor of 2 or 3 to 1 
across nearby states, for no 
clear economic reason and 
with no obvious economic 
consequences.
n States underinvest 
in customized business 
services and overinvest 
in tax incentives for 
low-wage businesses and 
long-term incentives.
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In March 2017 the Upjohn Institute released 
a new, publicly accessible database on economic 
development incentives, which are those offered 
by state and local governments as their “usual 
deal” to entice a business to locate a new facility. 
(The database is housed on the Upjohn Institute’s 
website: www.upjohn.org/models/bied/home.php.) 
These incentives include property tax abatements, 
job creation tax credits, investment tax credits, and 
R&D tax credits. They also include customized 
job training programs, under which community 
colleges provide a new facility with training for new 
workers that is customized to the facility’s needs. 
No other study of incentives is as comprehensive 
in covering diverse industries and lengthy time 
periods. Using data from 1990 to 2015, the “Panel 
Database on Incentives and Taxes” estimates 
marginal business taxes and business incentives for 
45 industries in 33 states; the industries compose 91 
percent of U.S. labor compensation, and the states 
produce over 92 percent of U.S. economic output. 
The database has data for a new facility starting 
up in each of 26 “start years.” Compared to prior 
studies, the new database provides more incentive 
details, such as how incentives are broken down 
by different incentive types (e.g., job creation tax 
credits vs. property tax abatements), and the time 
pattern by which incentives are paid out over a 
facility’s life cycle. 
The purpose of this new database is to help 
researchers and policymakers learn more about 
incentives and their effectiveness. Without 
knowing how different incentives vary over time 
and across industries for different states, it is 
impossible to conduct any meaningful incentives 
research or to subject incentives to any informed 
public debate. Do incentive differences across 
states, industries, or time lead to any significant 
effects on an industry’s growth in a state? Do 
incentives allocate more U.S. growth to needier 
areas or to industries that might boost national 
productivity? Without incentives data, such 
questions cannot begin to be addressed. 
In addition to being downloadable, the database 
is analyzed in an accompanying report (Bartik 
2017) that focuses on 31 “export-base” industries, 
which are those that sell their goods and services 
outside the state but not necessarily outside the 
country. Such industries provide the base for a 
state’s economy by bringing new money into the 
state. This article highlights the main findings in 
the report. 
Incentives are Large Compared to State and 
Local Business Taxes but Modest as a Share of 
Overall Costs 
Incentives for the average state’s base industries 
in 2015 offset around 30 percent of what otherwise 
would be charged in state and local business taxes. 
Incentives play a significant role in state and local 
taxes and budgets. 
On the other hand, incentives for base 
industries average about 1.4 percent of business 
value-added, a measure of the value of the 
business’s production. (Business value-added 
is defined as the business’s sales minus what it 
purchases from other businesses.) Incentives can 
be offset by modest variations in other business 
costs, such as wages. 
Incentives Tripled from 1990 to 2015 
Average incentives increased from 9 percent of 
business taxes in 1990 to 30 percent in 2015. As 
shown in Figure 1, this increase was most rapid 
Better Incentives Data Can 
Inform Both Research and Policy 
Timothy J. Bartik
The typical state does little industry 
targeting—for example, higher-
wage industries do not receive 
significantly higher incentives.
in the 1990s. In the past decade, some 
states have significantly expanded 
incentives while other states have made 
cuts. 
Incentives Vary Greatly across 
Nearby States, with No Obvious 
Strong Correlation with a State’s 
Economic Past or Future 
As shown in Figure 2, incentives 
often vary by a factor of 2 to 1 or 
more across nearby states. These 
incentive differences are not tied to a 
state’s unemployment, so incentives 
are not reallocating jobs to high 
unemployment areas. 
Incentive differences do not appear 
to have large effects on state economic 
growth by industry. The database 
suggests incentive effects toward the 
low end of prior estimates: the average 
incentive package, 1.4 percent of value-
added, might tip the location decision 
of 6 percent of incented businesses—
the other 94 percent of the time, the 
state would have experienced similar 
growth without the incentive. 
This typical 6 percent tip rate of 
incentives is a low batting average. 
To have benefits greater than costs, 
incentives must do something special—
they either need unusually high 
benefits per job created, or incentive 
designs must exceed the typical batting 
average, lowering costs per job created. 
Higher benefits per incented job 
can be achieved if incentives target 
high-wage or high-tech industries. 
High-wage industries obviously are 
good for those industries’ workers. In 
addition, because higher-wage workers 
have more income to spend at local 
retailers, such industries will have 
higher multiplier effects in creating 
other local jobs. Because high-tech 
industries tend to cluster, incented 
high-tech jobs might also have higher 
multipliers, with each induced high-
tech job creating five other local jobs 
(Moretti 2010). 
Incentives Vary Little 
across Industries
Even though some industries offer 
much greater benefits, the typical 
state does little industry targeting. 
As shown in Figure 3, higher-wage 
industries do not receive significantly 
higher incentives. Incentives do not 
particularly target high-tech, as each 
extra 10 percent of industry R&D 
spending only increases incentives by 
0.3 percent. 
Incentives are Excessively Long Term
Incentives are more effective if they 
are more up front. Because business 
executives tend to think in the short 
term, an incentive today is more 
effective at inducing location decisions 
than an incentive that is only paid out 
10 years from now. The average state 
has incentives that are still 1.1 percent 
of business value-added when a 
facility is in its tenth year of operation. 
Reducing such long-term incentives 
would lower long-term government 
costs of incentives without having 
much effect on job creation. 
States Underinvest in Customized 
Business Services 
Incentives designed as customized 
services may be more effective than tax 
incentives. For example, customized 
job training is a very effective incentive. 
Research suggests that, per dollar, 
customized job training might be 10 
times more effective than tax incentives 
in encouraging local business growth 
(Hollenbeck [2008]; Hoyt, Jepsen, and 
Troske [2008]; see also Holzer et al. 
[1993]). Other effective customized 
services include manufacturing 
extension programs, which have been 
shown to improve productivity (Jarmin 
1998). 
Why are such customized services 
more cost-effective? They tend to be 
more targeted than tax incentives at 
small and medium-sized businesses, 
whose location and expansion behavior 
is easier to affect than large businesses’. 
Because obtaining quality job training 
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Figure 1  Incentives as a Percent of Business Taxes, 1990–2015
NOTE: Chart shows the average magnitude of state and local business incentives as a percent of state and local 
business taxes, 1990–2015.
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations.
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services or business advice may be 
difficult for smaller businesses to 
do on their own, the value of such 
services may exceed their costs. Finally, 
customized services provide up-front 
assistance, helping the business be 
more productive immediately. 
However, despite the greater cost-
effectiveness of customized services, 
state and local incentives are more 
focused on tax incentives. For example, 
the typical state only spends $1 on 
customized job training for every $20 
devoted to tax incentives. 
Summary
While these conclusions are based 
on preliminary analysis of the “Panel 
Database on Incentives and Taxes,” 
the database allows for much more 
extensive examinations of different 
types of incentives for each state for 
diverse industries. Such detailed 
analyses can play an important role 
in the growing national movement 
toward subjecting incentives to 
greater transparency, evaluation, and 
accountability. According to the Pew 
Charitable Trusts (2016), “Since 2012, 
22 states and the District of Columbia 
have enacted laws requiring regular, 
rigorous, independent evaluation of tax 
incentives.” In addition, in 2015, the 
Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board adopted a new reporting 
standard, GASB 77, under which state 
and local governments that comply 
with “generally accepted accounting 
principles” must annually report at least 
the aggregate revenue foregone from 
each tax incentive program (Good Jobs 
First 2015). The database complements 
GASB 77 reports by providing more 
long-term and industry-detailed 
information on incentives. It supports 
state incentive evaluations by 
facilitating comparisons across states, 
industries, and incentive types. With 
better data and evaluation of incentives, 
state and local governments over time 
can reform such incentives to increase 
their benefits for state residents relative 
to costs. 
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NOTE: Chart shows state and local business incentives as a percent of business value-added across three pairs 
of adjacent states as of 2015.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Figure 2  Incentives across Nearby States as a Percent of Value-Added, 2015
Figure 3  Comparison of Incentives vs. Wages across Industries, as of 2015
NOTE: Each dot represents 1 of 31 export-base industries. The vertical axis shows the national average for state 
and local business incentives for that industry, as a percent of that industry’s value-added. The horizontal 
axis shows the industry’s average wages per full-time equivalent worker.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Policy analysts, economists, and 
demographers argue that individuals 
must extend their work lives if they 
are to achieve their desired standards 
of living in retirement. Increases in 
longevity imply that those who leave 
the labor force at traditional retirement 
ages must either save more during 
their working careers or consume less 
during their retirement. 
The logic behind later retirement 
from the employee’s perspective is 
clear and has been studied in detail: 
remaining in the labor force for 
additional years is needed to support 
increasing years in retirement. 
However, relatively few studies have 
directly addressed how employers 
feel about having workers remain on 
the job until older ages. Our book, 
Extending Work Life: Can Employers 
Adapt When Employees Want to Delay 
Retirement?, which was recently 
published by the Upjohn Institute 
(see p. 7), seeks to fill this gap by 
providing a comprehensive assessment 
of the costs and benefits to employers 
of accommodating later retirement 
ages. Through their employment and 
compensation policies, employers can 
either assist or restrict workers’ ability 
to remain on the job. 
Economic theory of the firm 
indicates that companies determine 
the optimal number of workers to 
hire and the appropriate age and skill 
composition of their workforces. A 
firm will need a mix of employees of 
different skill types, skill levels, and 
vintages of human capital. Changes in 
the age structure of a firm’s workforce 
due to delayed retirement can affect 
labor costs, productivity, profitability, 
and sustainability. Companies develop 
their compensation policies to attract, 
retain, motivate, and ultimately retire 
their desired workforces. As a result, 
shifts in worker preferences may lead 
to changes in company policies.
Employers must consider the 
advantages and costs of retaining 
or hiring older workers. Older 
workers often are relatively highly 
compensated, and some will experience 
diminished productivity at older ages. 
Furthermore, as employers retain 
older workers, the opportunities for 
advancement by younger workers 
might be restricted. Employers must 
address the changing demographics 
in their workforces. By creating 
compensation and employment 
policies to accommodate prolonged 
or delayed retirement transitions, 
employers will be better positioned to 
reap the benefits of employing older 
workers. 
What factors influence a firm’s 
willingness to retain older workers? 
Can companies develop transitional 
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Retiring Later
Are Employers Ready for the New Employment Trend?
Robert L. Clark and Melinda Sandler Morrill
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Between 1994 and 2014, the labor force participation rate for men aged 65–69 rose 
from 27 to 36 percent.
n By creating compensation and employment policies to accommodate prolonged or 
delayed retirement transitions, employers will be better positioned to reap the benefits 
of employing older workers.
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by Pew Charitable Trusts. The findings of this article and 
the report are those of the author, and may not reflect 
the views of the Pew Charitable Trusts or the Upjohn 
Institute. 
Better Incentives Data Can Inform 
Both Research and Policy
5Through their employment and 
compensation policies, employers 
can either assist or restrict workers’ 
ability to remain on the job.
to decline. At the same time, wages 
and salaries typically rise with years 
on the job. The cost of employee 
benefits—especially health insurance, 
pension contributions, and paid time 
off—also increases with age. Economic 
theory indicates that when a worker’s 
marginal productivity falls below the 
marginal cost to the firm, then a firm 
has an economic rationale to want this 
employee to retire. 
Pay scales and benefits help firms 
attract the desired labor force and then 
retain them. Companies also develop 
policies to incentivize employees 
to retire when it is optimal for the 
employer. If workers do not retire 
around these ages, the company will 
be adversely affected. Thus, many 
employers will resist later retirement 
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employment contracts so workers can 
shift to new areas, perhaps with less 
responsibility and lower compensation, 
while remaining with their career 
employers? While exploring the 
bottlenecks and constraints that 
might inhibit the development of 
delayed retirement policies, our 
book provides new insights into how 
retirement transitions might develop 
in the coming years and the potential 
implications for legislative and 
employer policies regarding retirement 
ages. 
Changing Patterns of Retirement
Throughout most of the twentieth 
century, labor force participation 
rates of older individuals steadily 
declined as real income increased. 
The establishment of Social Security 
in 1935 promised workers a base 
income in retirement. In the post–
World War II period, employers began 
offering pension plans that provided 
additional retirement income. As these 
plans gained popularity, employers 
developed pensions that provided 
significant incentives for workers to 
retire at or before age 65. Employers 
encouraging retirement at relatively 
young ages was the result of a rapidly 
growing population that enabled firms 
to hire younger workers at lower wages. 
Increases in educational attainment 
and the emergence of new technologies 
reduced the competitive advantage of 
experience. Thus, changing economic 
and demographic conditions provided 
the impetus for employers to develop 
employment and compensation 
policies that encouraged retirement at 
specific ages. 
In the past twenty-five years, there 
have been substantial changes in the 
proportion of older persons in the 
labor force. As Figure 1 shows, between 
1994 and 2014 the largest changes 
for men have been for individuals 
aged 62 and older. The labor force 
participation rate for men aged 
62–64 increased from 45 to 56 percent 
during this period, while the rate for 
men aged 65–69 rose from 27 to 36 
percent. Participation rates for women 
followed a similar pattern; however, 
the increases were greater for younger 
women. The proportion of women aged 
55–59 who were in the labor force rose 
from 59 to 66 percent, and the rate for 
women aged 60–61 increased from 45 
to 58 percent. These trends in increased 
labor force participation are projected 
to continue. That, combined with the 
aging of the population, has resulted in 
a more than doubling of the number of 
workers aged 55 and older, from 15.5 
million in 1994 to 33.9 million in 2014. 
As workers seek to delay retirement, 
firms must review their policies and 
determine whether and how they will 
accommodate later retirement.
Employer Concerns about  
Delayed Retirement
The most important issue for 
employers associated with delayed 
retirement is the impact of an aging 
labor force on productivity and labor 
costs. Many employers believe that 
at some point productivity begins 
Figure 1  Labor Force Participation Rates for Men and Women Aged 55 and Older (%)
SOURCE: Toosi (2015).
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because they believe it will lower 
productivity, raise costs, and alter 
the optimal age distribution of their 
workforce. 
Employer Policies for the Future
Assuming that employees will 
continue to desire later retirement, 
employers must decide how they will 
respond. They may seek to develop 
new compensation and employment 
policies. They might find that, all else 
equal, it is optimal to accommodate 
workers’ preferences for working 
longer by modifying job assignments 
and compensation policies. However, 
employers may also face barriers 
when making adjustments to working 
conditions and/or compensation, such 
as union contracts, age discrimination 
laws, tax law and pension regulations, 
and production techniques. 
In some settings, phased retirement 
and return-to-work policies might 
make sense to both employees and 
employers. Many workers may prefer 
restructured compensation while 
remaining with their current employers 
rather than retiring and seeking new 
employment in a bridge job. Despite 
this, the use of these policies in today’s 
workforces is somewhat limited. 
Employers may have informal policies 
with the aim of keeping the best 
workers but may be reluctant to have 
a broad program that offers phased 
retirement to all qualified employees. 
Employers might also be reluctant to 
adopt such policies for fear that they 
might run afoul of federal and state age 
discrimination policies.
It seems likely that firms will face 
increasing demand from employees 
to delay retirement. New research is 
needed to provide a better framework 
in which to evaluate the impact of 
this expected change on labor costs 
and productivity. For example, would 
individuals actually prefer a decreasing 
wage profile at the end of a career prior 
to complete retirement? Would this 
type of contract be more appealing 
if framed as a lifetime compensation 
package rather than a decline in salary 
at the end of career? The presence of 
bridge jobs suggests that lower wages 
and fewer hours are appealing to some 
older workers. 
In the longer term, if employers 
accommodate later retirement, does 
this lead to new types of employment 
contracts? For example, if the incidence 
of phased retirement increases, 
then we might expect adjustments 
in employment contracts that pre-
commit workers to lower salaries 
and/or benefits at older ages. Do 
employers find it more efficient to 
set up formal policies regarding 
retirement transitions, such as phased 
retirement options or return-to-
work postretirement? If so, are tax 
policies and government-provided 
retirement benefits designed optimally 
to allow for new types of employment 
relationships? What new types of 
employment contracts are currently 
being introduced to accommodate 
trends toward working longer? 
If working longer is deemed to be 
beneficial for individuals, society, and 
the economy, legislative policies could 
be adopted to increase incentives for 
individuals to remain in the labor 
force and for firms to employ older 
workers. Policymakers could identify 
and remove any real or perceived age 
discrimination issues associated with 
phased retirement programs. This 
would signal the benefit of modifying 
working conditions and compensation 
policies to ensure employing older 
workers is cost-effective. Redesigned 
jobs and reduced working hours, 
combined with access to retirement 
benefits when entering phased 
retirement, could make employees 
more willing to leave full-time 
employment and accept these new 
conditions. 
Much of this analysis focuses on 
the impact of delayed retirement on 
individual employers, holding constant 
market forces. In many aspects, this is 
how a firm would view these changes. 
However, demographic changes and 
any ensuing macroeconomic shifts 
will alter the labor market over time. 
For example, downward pressure 
on market wages will increase the 
willingness of firms to accommodate 
preferences for older retirement ages. 
Extending Worklife outlines how 
individual employers might view 
sudden changes in the retirement ages 
of their workforce. We emphasize how 
the push toward delayed retirement 
might not be desirable to individual 
employers. We speculate that as 
individuals choose to delay retirement, 
firms will respond by trying to form 
new types of employment contracts 
more suited to the preferences of older 
workers and consistent with their 
changing value to firms.
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Many employers will resist later 
retirement because they believe 
it will lower productivity, raise 
costs, and alter the optimal age 
distribution of their workforce.
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Extending Work Life
Can Employers Adapt 
When Employees Want 
to Delay Retirement?
Robert Clark and Melinda Sandler Morrill
According to the authors of this WEfocus Series 
book, “Many policy analysts, economists, and 
demographers have argued that individuals must 
extend their work lives if they are to achieve their 
desired standard of 
living in retirement. 
Increases in longevity 
imply that individuals 
who leave the labor 
force at traditional 
retirement ages 
must either save 
more during their 
working careers or 
consume less during 
their retirement. Reductions in the generosity of 
employer- and government-funded retirement 
programs exacerbate this problem. Thus, workers 
today must save more than their predecessors to 
achieve the same level of retirement well-being. 
The idea seems clear—working longer and 
retiring later is the only way future retirees can 
sufficiently finance their retirement.”
While working longer may be necessary to 
support more years in retirement, few studies 
have examined this phenomenon from the 
employer perspective. This book seeks to fill that 
gap by providing a comprehensive assessment 
of the costs and benefits to employers of 
accommodating an increasing desire for delayed 
or phased retirement.
88 pp. 2016
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-528-3 
PDF is available as a free download
How Did Employee 
Ownership Firms 
Weather the Last Two 
Recessions?
Employee Ownership, 
Employment Stability, and 
Firm Survival: 1999–2011
Fidan Ana Kurtulus and Douglas L. Kruse
Employee ownership firms offer workers the 
opportunity to own a stake in the firms where 
they work. This 
affords them the 
ability to share in 
profits and have a 
voice in firm-related 
decision making. In 
this comprehensive 
new book, Kurtulus 
and Kruse provide 
new evidence on 
whether employee 
ownership firms are better equipped to survive 
recessions. In particular, they focus on broad-
based employee ownership, which includes 
ownership at all levels in the firm’s hierarchy.
The authors begin by defining employee 
ownership, and then discuss the prevalence of 
such firms in the United States. They also examine 
how employee ownership affects employment 
stability and why employee ownership firms have 
survived recessions more successfully than other 
firms.
Kurtulus and Kruse conclude by saying that the 
benefits they observed in employee ownership 
firms, particularly the greater employment 
stability and survival rates, can help the overall 
economy. Therefore, increased government 
support to broaden employee ownership 
programs is merited. 
178 pp. 2016 / $18 paper 978-0-88099-525-2 / 
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-526-9
series
WE focus
Workers’ Compensation: 
Analysis for Its Second 
Century
H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender
Workers’ compensation (WC) is the original form 
of social insurance as well as the first no-fault 
insurance program. Under WC, workers receive 
compensation 
and treatment for 
workplace injuries 
and disease in 
exchange for giving 
up the right to sue 
their employers for 
negligence. Each 
state and Canadian 
province runs its own 
WC program, and how 
each is administered and the level of benefits 
provided vary considerably. Therefore, assessing 
best practices among these programs is tricky. 
H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender provide a 
succinct analysis of the state of WC programs 
in North America by focusing on three key 
performance issues: 1) the adequacy of 
compensation for those disabled in the 
workplace, 2) return-to-work performance for 
injured workers, and 3) prevention of disabling 
injury and disease. Following a brief introductory 
chapter that provides a discussion of the 
difficulties of trying to compare so many diverse 
programs, Hunt and Dillender devote a chapter 
to each of the three performance issues and 
provide empirical findings and useful guidance 
for policymakers and researchers as they set 
their sights on adapting WC for the twenty-first 
century.
132 pp. 2017
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-530-6
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/up_press/244/
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2017 Upjohn Institute Dissertation Award
The Upjohn Institute invites submissions for its annual prize for the best PhD dissertation on employment-related 
issues. A first prize of $2,500 is being offered. Up to two honorable mention awards of $1,000 may also be given. 
The deadline to apply for the 2017 award is July 7. Learn more at upjohn.org.
